



Transparency International  
Anticorruption Center



# **ELECTRONIC MONITORING OF 2012-2013 ELECTIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA**



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## ANALYSIS OF VOTING RESULTS FOR ELECTIONS OF ARMENIA 2012-2013

**The publication present the summary of the results of analysis of electronic monitoring, which has been conducted based on the official data of 2012 National Assembly, 2013 presidential and 2013 Yerevan City Council elections.**

Transparency International Anticorruption Center public organization (TIAC PO) carried out precise calculations for estimating the degree of fairness of the voting process, exact and fast estimate of the election results and, based on them, analysis of the electoral processes of the 2012 National Assembly, 2013 presidential and 2013 Yerevan City Council elections.

The team lead by Lyudvig Khachatryan, author of the book "Electoral rights and falsifications of elections" (ISBN 978-9939-53-733-7), carried out mathematical analytical calculations of the participation of voters and results of elections through an electronic monitoring program for elections, developed and conducted by the mentioned team. The monitoring program is based on the methods, described in the book. These methods allow to comparing voting numbers, precisely calculating possible change in the distribution of seats, and determining the number and ownership of the fairly distributed, independent from violations seats. Calculations and analysis have been carried out based on official data of the Central Electoral Commission, Police of the Republic of Armenia and National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia through comparing the official data on the number of voters and participants, voting results and other official data by marzes (regions), settlements, electoral districts and precincts, which were filled into the mentioned above electronic monitoring program.

During the voting day, throughout all precincts it has been checked the participation exceeding the physical capacity of voting process and precincts with such participation have been sorted out. Immediately has been calculated and has been shown the results of voting and comparative analytical data.

There have been revealed and separated out those precincts, where breaches of legal requirements and electoral procedures, inaccuracies, ballot stuffing, as well as mismatches in the numbers of voters, ballot papers, ballot envelopes, participation, votes and other voting numbers have been detected.

Instructions on how to use the program of electronic monitoring of elections and complete and detailed results of the monitoring with corresponding diagrams, charts, explanations and analysis are published on the TIAC web site: [www.transparency.am](http://www.transparency.am) (see 2012 and 2013 national elections and Yerevan City Council 2013 elections or visit <http://elections.transparency.am/>) The users of the have a chance to compare, check and find out possible inaccuracies in the officially published voters lists. They also can find out the recording speed of registration of the voters, who came to vote, and changes of voting distributions depending on the numbers of participated voters in the electoral precincts. They also can look and compare the election numbers and graphic charts formed from the comparison with each other.

## 2012 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PROPORTIONAL LIST ELECTIONS

1. According to the official statistical data of the National Statistical Service (see [www.armstat.am](http://www.armstat.am)), the population of the Republic of Armenia is 3,325,051, who live in 925 communities/settlements. At the same time, according to data posted on the official website of the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Armenia ([www.elections.am](http://www.elections.am)) the total number of voters is equal to 2,499,325, which constitutes about 75.2% of the population.

In some communities the percentage of voters included in the voters' lists relative to the numbers of population residing there was too high. Also, there were settlements, where the percentage of voters, participated in the vote, relative to the number of population was high.

In 54 communities the number of voters exceeded the number of population. In those communities the total number of population was 21,695 and the total number of voters was 33790. Only in some of those communities military units are accommodate, which could serve as an explanation for such ratios. Another explanation could be that in those communities the number of registered residents was more, than the number of population, showed in the National Statistical Service (NSS) statistical data, but in that case the number of voters, participated in the vote, should not exceed the number of population, recorded through statistical data.

- In 101 communities the number of voters has been more than 90% of the number of population. The total number of population in those communities was 238,136 and the total number of voters – 233,842. Thus, in 47


communities the number of voters has been from 90% to 100% relative to total number of population (216,441 residents, out of which 200,052 were voters). In the remaining 54 communities, as mentioned above, the number of voters exceeded the number of population.

- In 237 communities the number of voters has been more than 80% of the number of population. The total number of population was 865,165 and the total number of voters – 766,149. This means that in 136 communities the number of voters has been from 80% to 90% of population (627,029 residents, out of which 532,307 were voters).
- In 368 communities the number of voters has been more than 75% of the number of population (1,369,865 residents, out of which 1,153,434 were voters).


If we take into consideration that the actual number population is much less, thus in the predominating majority of residences the quantity of present voters wouldn't outnumber the general quantity of 70% population. So observing the data of corresponding residences we will have the following view: in 540 residences the quantity of voters has been more than 70% of population, as the general quantity of population is 2168060 and the general quantity of the voters is 1733376. Besides that in 582 electoral precincts of indicated residences the quantity of voters, participated in vote, is more than 70% of the voters in those electoral precincts, in 183 electoral precincts – 80%, in 34 electoral precincts – 90%.

Below you can see the graphic chart for the results of the distributing votes, participated in electoral precincts with more or less from 70% and in the whole area of republic, with the results of all electoral precincts.

Distribution of votes according to those 1373 electoral precincts where the quantity of voters participated in the poll 1184634 is 70% less from the quantity of voters included in the list.



Distribution of votes according to those 609 electoral precincts where the quantity of voters participated in the poll 388419 outnumbers 70% from the quantity of voters included in the list.



2. According to officially published data about participation of the periodicity for 3 hours there are a lot of electoral precincts where the quickness of poll is less probable.

The polling stations can serve only some voters by one or two lists a certain period of time. We can reveal the falsifications if we consider the minimum possible time, in seconds, which can be spent in accordance with the procedure for the registration of voters in the voter list, even without taking into account the time spent in the voting booth and ballot box and comparing it with the precincts data.


If we observe those electoral precincts, which have registered much more participation from the possible permission, and without stop, during 3 hours in the case of continuous stream of voters it is less possible or impossible participation, its quantity will reach more than 100%, moreover with high percentage of participation, average of 75%.

For example we introduce the graphic chart for one of the electoral precincts, N 40/32, which has been calculated and formed based on the published data about participation. Here for

one person in one list the average minimum quickness of registration has been calculated impossibly 21 seconds. In the indicated election district in two lists of voters has been recorded 1071 voters during 3 hours.


### Precinct N 40/32

Comparison of the average voting time, for every voter, with the indicated physically possible average time in seconds, during 3 hours in the case of continuous stream of voters, according to the officially published data about participation.



- The average spent time in seconds for one voter in polling station in current three hours period.
- Indicated or measured possible minimum average spent time in seconds for one voter in polling station in current three hours period.


### The measures of participation in every 3 hours according to the published data of electoral precincts



- The possible quantity of participants during 3 hours in the election station, according to the selected quickness for participation of one person.
- The quantities of participated voters in the voting during 3 hours in the election station.




The measures of the participation according to the published data in electoral precincts



The average percentage of participation in more than 100 indicated electoral precincts is 75%. Moreover, the participation in 70 electoral precincts outnumbers 70%. The participation in 30 electoral precincts outnumbers 80%. The participation in 10 electoral precincts outnumbers 90%. In the majority of indicated electoral precincts, in more than 80, the maximum votes have been counted for the governing Republican Party of Armenia (RPA). And in other electoral precincts, in more than 20, the maximum votes have been counted for Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP), which has taken the 3rd place. In those electoral precincts in favor of them all together has been counted about 79% of votes: for RPA - 53%, for PAP - 26%.

- There are 20 electoral precincts, where the published numbers for participation of voters have been decreased for the following hours. Negative participation has been recorded, thus the further time instead of increasing the quantity of participated voters in the poll has been decreased.

Here is represented the graphic chart which is formed based on the published data about participation of one of the electoral precincts, N12/26.



In more than half of 20 indicated electoral precincts has been registered more than 70% participation. And all together has been registered average of 68%. In 18 of those electoral precincts the maximum votes have been counted in favor of governing RPA, and in 2 electoral precincts have been counted in favor of PAP, which was taken the second place.

4. There are mismatches of voting numbers in 1436 electoral precincts. The general minimum sum of mismatches of voting numbers in the indicated electoral precincts will be 1.2% of the quantity of participated voters in the elections.
5. Have been recorded 3.42% invalid voting –paper of the quantity of participated voters in the elections.
6. The difference between the general quantities of the signatures of voters, who are registered in the lists of voters for

participating in the poll and the general quantity of the envelopes of voters in the ballot-box has been 0.9% of the quantity of participated voters in the elections.

7. In those electoral precincts, where the percentages of participated voters in the elections are high, the percentages of votes of governing RPA are high too. Simultaneous of increasing percentages for participation in the electoral precincts, the percentages of other parties' votes are decreasing.

Besides that the officially counted votes for 5 of 9 parties and one alliance of parties have been counted in such a way that no one of the last parties for getting mandates will not have less votes from the internal line. Among them the votes of 3 parties and one alliance of parties are very near to get mandates defined between 5% and 7%. For the other 3 parties, which haven't got mandates, the counted votes haven't out numbered 2%.

**Below are represented the graphic charts, which are counted and formed based on the results of participation in the corresponding electoral precincts according to the officially published data:**

The percentages of general votes from participation, counted for parties.  
According to the less participation from 50% in the selected electoral precincts.




With officially results of elections by proportional electoral system of the National Assembly of the RA in favor of political companies:

The distribution of counted votes with percentages  
From the sum of the counted valid votes and inaccuracies.



According to **more** participation from indicated percentage in the selected electoral precincts



Distributing correlation of mandates would be another in the case of

- taking account of above mentioned circumstances,
- finding out the real results of elections,
- invalidating the results of vote, which has been spent in the electoral precincts, full of deviations from the demands of the electoral legislation,
- reorganizing poll to find out the real votes of voters.

The results of electronic monitoring analysis shows that there are some areas where there are no garrisons, but the numbers of voters may be higher than the population figures of communities, according to the officially published data for National Assembly elections.

There are some strange addresses in which voters are registered, for example, beside a street, in a building yard, garden-plot, etc.

There are some addresses where a very large number of voters are registered.

There are precincts, where the published quantity of participated voters after further time has been decreased instead of increasing.

There are a lot of voting precincts where the votes have been organized by an incredible speed that was physically impossible.

There are a lot of factors, which prove that the elections, for the formation of the National Assembly did not pass fairly, free, with no deviations from the requirements of the law, purely and without fraud.

The ratio of distribution of mandates would be different if we considered all aforementioned factors, found out the real results of voting, recognized void results of voting, repeated voting in precincts where had been some falsifications and deviations from requirements of the elections law.

## PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF ARMENIA 2013

The attempt, which was made upon one of the candidates, Paruyr Hayrikyan, didn't have any consequences. The elections weren't postponed or new elections weren't set, although the candidate was getting cured for a long time during the campaign and after the elections. Is it possible to consider that those events couldn't have an influence on the process of the elections and consequently on the results of the elections.

### **Whether the results of the voting are authentic**

Below you can see the facts and official data based on the executed analytical results, on which you can conclude that the official results of the voting aren't authentic in a lot of elections precincts.

We by means of the film practically have defined for one voter physically possible minimum voting time to compare the quantity of voters with throughput of polling station.

We compared the officially published data of participation in an interval 3 hours with the throughput of electoral precincts.

1. According to the video Alplus TV the registration for voting of Rita Sargsyan and Serzh Sargsyan (president of Armenia) has been at once with filling up the data of passport, signing and giving the voting-paper. According to the chronometer of video the duration as minimum is about 58 seconds, for everyone is about 29 seconds, may be it is the fastest.

Next are represented the episodes of the video according to the chronometer



And in the same list the time of voting and registration is about 120 seconds, the average minimum time, spent for every voting, is not less than 60 seconds.



Watch out - you mustn't confuse **the time of voting** with **the time of registration**. To calculate the **physical possible permissibility** of the polling station and to find out more registered votes of them in the electoral precincts we take the average minimum time of one voter **for registration** in the list of an election precincts and **for giving the voting-paper**. The average minimum time of

registration for one voter is less from the average minimum time of voting and must be more than physical possible time of registration for one voter.


So as to separate electoral precincts where participation in voting more Than physical possible permissibility we compute the average minimum time of one voter for registration in the list of the polling station and compare it to minimum possible time for registration of one voter in one list.

To define physical possible throughput of polling station for the given time interval (3-hour, 10800 seconds), we divide the time (10800 seconds) to the minimum possible time for registration.

So we can define polling stations with falsifications for given time comparing the published number of voters participating in voting with physically possible throughput.

According to “168hour” video, Levon Ter Petrosyan’s registration for participation, which has taken place without losing seconds, at once filling up the data of passport, signing and giving the voting-paper, duration is more than 30 seconds.

Here are represented the episodes of the video according to the chronometer



And the voting, including the time of registration in the list is more than 95 seconds.



According to the video-recording done by an observer, without stopping, for checking the identities of soldiers-voters, for finding the corresponding line in the list, for filling up the data of document “proof of identity”, for signing in the list, for giving the voting-paper and envelope near the table of the voters -list in the electoral precincts has been spent about 237 seconds ( $37+57+60+36+47=237$ ).

Here are represented the episodes of the video according to the chronometer



In separate cases for registration of some voters has been spent also 90 seconds and much more time, which haven't been taken account of the average minimum time, spent for only registration of one voter and counting permissibility of the electoral precincts.

According to the video if we calculate only spent time for registration in the list of voters-soldiers, let's suppose that they could register and give voting-paper more than 237 seconds instead of 230 seconds, thus the average minimum time which is spent for the registration of one voter would be  $(230/5)$  46 seconds.

We can notice that the average minimum time for citizens will be much more hence from represented minimum time.

Considering that spent time in the polling-booth and near the ballot-box is less and will not cause queue and if we take account of one list near one table the average minimum time is 46 seconds for registration of one voter, afterwards during 3 hours, in the case of continuous stream of voters, with one table of the voters' lists in the election district, the maximum quantity of the physically possible participants in voting will be 235 voters ( $3*3600/46=235$ ).

The average minimum time for registration of one voter, considering not 46 seconds but 44 seconds during 3 hours in the case of continuous stream of voters, with one table of the lists for registration of voters till 1000 people, in the election district the maximum quantity of the physically possible participants in voting during 3 hours can be no more than 246 ( $3*3600/44=246$ ). In the case of 2 tables of voters (having more than 1000 voters) the average minimum time has to consider 44 seconds for simultaneous registration of 2 voters, so it means that the maximum quantity of the physically possible participants in voting during 3 hours, in the electoral precincts with 2 lists of voters can be no more than more twice from the previous quantity ( $246*2=492$ ).

It is adopted by legislation that for up to 1000 voters is foreseen one table of the voters-lists, and the voting lasts 12 hours. So we can conclude that it has been calculated theoretically that with one table in the election district can be served during one hour

(1000/12) about 83 voters, and during 3 hours can be served ( $3 \times 1000 / 12 = 250$ ) 250 voters, for voters from 1000 to 2000 with 2 tables during 3 hours can be served ( $250 \times 2 = 500$ ) 500 voters.

So the registration in a list of every voter in unbroken turn during 3 hours is in the following way:

- Checking identity of voter
- Searching the corresponding line in the list
- Filling up the data of document “proof of identity”
- Signing by voter in the corresponding place of the list
- Sealing in front of signature of voter by the member of commission in the same line
- Handing the voting-paper and envelope to the voter.

For these processes the average minimum 44 seconds are spent for one voter, therefore in the case of unbroken turn the electoral precincts, which have noted registrations less than 44 seconds for every voter, give rise to doubt. So those electoral precincts fall under suspicion, which during 3 hours have noted 250 participations in the case of one table of voter registration list and more than 500 participations in the case of 2 tables.

It would be more physically possible participants at less speed if all voters in turn had been registered without checking documents “proof of identity” of voter and searching the corresponding line in the list, putting the signatures in not corresponding places of the list, filling incorrect data of document “proof of identity” of voter and adding fake signatures in the lists.

It is also possible with above mentioned consequences that the

quantity of voter signatures will not correspond to the quantity of envelopes in the ballot-box, or it can be other lack of correspondences.

There are about 200 electoral precincts with participation of 74% (200000) voters. Here have been noted near the average minimum 44 seconds and less time for registration of one voter in the list near the table. In these electoral precincts the quantity of participated voters in the voting has outnumbered 250 and the lists for registration with 2 tables – 500. Besides that in the most part of those electoral precincts the soldiers haven't voted and only citizens have participated in the participation.

For the voting of one voter, in little probability, the quantity of the elections precincts, which have been recorded votes with less speed than 60 seconds, is 886, with the general number of 1355474 voters and with the general numbers of 873041 (64.4%) participated voters in the poll.

And more accurate, in practice it is less probable to spend 46 seconds for registration of voters near one table. The numbers of elections districts with more participation than 235, which have been recorded less duration than the average minimum time, is 269. The general number of participants is 286241 (with 72.41% of the general number of voters in the given electoral precincts). The number of elections districts, which have recorded less duration than 44 seconds is 184. The number of participants is 197619 (73.99%). The number of electoral precincts, which have recorded almost impossible less duration than 40 seconds, is 101. The general number of participants is 109700 (76.28%).

So, in numerous electoral precincts have been recorded officially polls at almost or absolutely impossible speed and during 3 hours participations, which have outnumbered the possible physically permissibility of the electoral precincts, not only in practice but also in theory.

Here are given 2 examples:

1. In N 23/58 election district of Sotq village from 8.00 o'clock to 11.00 have been recorded voting at speed of the average minimum 24 seconds for every voter. As there the polls have been organized with 2 tables of lists for registration, therefore with every list the registration has been realized at speed of the average minimum 24 seconds for one voter. According to the official data during 3 hours 882 voters have participated in the poll, and it is incomparable theoretically with possible 500. Even if the soldiers have voted too and let's suppose that in the list to look for the lines of their names wasn't spent any seconds, therefore is it possible such speed for registration in the electoral lists of voters data participated in the elections and handing voting – papers, all the more polls. During 3 hours with 2 tables of the lists for registration the participation of 882 voters is incomparable, even impossible  $\{(3*60*60\text{secs}/30\text{secs})*2=360*2=720\}$  with 720.


In N 17/25 election district of Deghdzut village from 11.00 o'clock to 14.00 have been recorded registration in the voter-list and voting at speed of the average minimum impossible 24 seconds for every voter. The quantity of voters from elections districts is 695, therefore, according to the law; the polls have been organized with one list of

voters, with one table of the lists for registration. According to the official data soldiers haven't voted, and during 3 hours 436 voters have participated in the poll, which is incomparable, even impossible  $\{(3 \cdot 60 \cdot 60 \text{secs} / 30 \text{secs})\}$  with 360.

Below are represented numerical and graphical charts which have been calculated by the project of electronic monitoring based on the official data for indicated election district.


#### Election district 17/25

Comparison of the average voting time, for every voter, with the indicated physically possible average time in seconds, during 3 hours in the case of continuous stream of voters, according to the officially published data about participation.




- Indicated or measured physically possible minimum time with seconds, which can be waste according to the defined order for registration of voter and for giving a voting-paper and an envelope.
- The average time with seconds for voting of one person every 3 hours.

According to the published data of electoral precincts, the measures of participation every 3 hours.



- During 3 hours the possible quantity of participants in the electoral precincts, according to chosen speed for voting of one person.
- The quantity of participated voters in the poll during every 3 hours

The measures of participation according to the published data of electoral precincts



- The quantity of voters in the electoral precincts
- At the proper time the possible quantity of voters in the electoral precincts, according to the selected speed for voting of one person
- The quantity of participated voters in the elections in the electoral precincts, according to published data in the periodicity of 3 hours.

The average percentage of participation in organized polls of more than 200 electoral precincts at less probable or almost improbable speed is 74%. The participation outnumbers 70% from about 180 electoral precincts, 80% from 50 electoral precincts, and 90% from 10 electoral precincts. In the majority of indicated electoral

precincts, in more than 180, the maximum votes have been calculated in favor of Serzh Sargsyan. The others, in the electoral precincts of less participation than 70% the maximum votes have been calculated in favor of second candidate Rafi Hovannisyan.

II. If we take account that in the republic the quantity of voters have increased, although the quantity of population has decreased, so the quantity of current voters in any residence and the quantity of participants in the poll objectively couldn't be more from the quantity of current voters, all the more of current population in that residence. In those residences, where have been recorded participations with high percentage, in some electoral precincts the measures of participation could outnumber not only the quantity of current voters in the electoral precincts, but also the quantity of current population including children. Unfortunately after the last census of population according to the quantity of current population of residences and electoral precincts haven't been published till the elections, and the quantity of current voters, according to the electoral precincts haven't been found out not neither by the governmental structures, nor the interested organizations. Even if it wasn't provided by the legislation and it was an additional chance for abuse.

According to the regions the initial data of 2011 census of population had been published, which had been taken as a principle and had been compared with the results of the vote in the regions. Even with the results of that comparison we can conclude that there are some regions where have been recorded the quantity of voters participated in the poll with less probable and high percentages.




Here are represented the comparisons of the quantity of population in the regions (marz), the quantity of voters and the quantity of voters participated in the voting.

		Population in 2011		Voter in 2012	% from population		Participant	% from the quantity of voters	% from the current population	The difference of pop. quantity from 2001 to 2011		The difference of voters quantity from 2001 to 2011
		Permanent	Current		Permanent	Current				Permanent	Current	
	Republic of Armenia	3018854	2871771	2524960	83,64%	87,92%	1574235	62,35%	54,82%	-194157	-130823	202346
1.	Yerevan	1060138	1054698	814949	76,87%	77,27%	484344	59,43%	45,92%	-43350	-36537	64720
2.	Aragatsotn	132925	125539	113700	85,54%	90,57%	78986	69,47%	62,92%	-5376	-739	18732
3.	Ararat	260367	246880	212832	81,74%	86,21%	149408	70,2%	60,52%	-11649	-5785	24267
4.	Armavir	265770	256639	222676	83,79%	86,77%	125131	56,19%	48,76%	-10463	778	18607
5.	Gegharkunik	235075	211828	186099	79,17%	87,85%	122916	66,05%	58,03%	-2575	-3543	14956
6.	Lori	235537	217103	235962	100,18%	108,69%	139981	59,32%	64,48%	-50871	-36248	-2694
7.	Kotayk	254397	245324	232737	91,49%	94,87%	150472	64,65%	61,34%	-18072	3987	23598
8.	Shirak	251941	233308	228767	90,8%	98,05%	131653	57,55%	56,43%	-31448	-23934	17959
9.	Syunik	141771	119873	121449	85,67%	101,31%	87932	72,4%	73,35%	-10913	-14188	-2470
10.	Vayots Dzor	52324	47659	47471	90,73%	99,61%	31748	66,88%	66,61%	-3673	-5571	9936
11.	Tavush	128609	112920	108318	84,22%	95,92%	71664	66,16%	63,46%	-5767	-9043	14735

The quantity of pop. according to provinces taken from the same results of 2011 population census published in 2012 web site [armstat.am](http://armstat.am)

				2011 Population			% from the population		The difference of numbers of		
				Permanent	Current		Permanent	Current	Population 2011	Voters 2013-2012	
The quantity of pop. according to residences taken from 2011 Statistical data base of armstat.am											
	Republic of Armenia	3262600	2483424	76,1%							
1	Yerevan	1121900	804681	71,7%							
2	Aragatsotn	142400	113594	79,8%							
3	Ararat	280400	208795	74,5%							
4	Armavir	285800	221596	77,5%							
5	Gegharkunik	242400	182499	75,3%							
6	Lori	282100	235862	83,6%							
7	Kotayk	282100	230755	81,8%							
8	Shirak	282000	228323	81%							
9	Syunik	152900	105443	69%							
10	Vayots Dzor	56000	46512	83,1%							
11	Tavush	134600	105364	78,3%							
					3018854	2871771	2510887	83,17%	87,43%	-243746	27463
					1060138	1054698	814812	76,86%	77,26%	-61762	10131
					132925	125539	115281	86,73%	91,83%	-9475	1687
					260367	246880	211320	81,16%	85,6%	-20033	2525
					265770	256639	224787	84,58%	87,59%	-20030	3191
					235075	211828	184599	78,53%	87,15%	-7325	2100
					235537	217103	237869	100,99%	109,57%	-46563	2007
					254397	245324	232995	91,59%	94,97%	-27703	2240
					251941	233308	230583	91,52%	98,83%	-30059	2260
					141771	119873	105754	74,59%	88,22%	-11129	311
					52324	47659	46712	89,27%	98,01%	-3676	200
					128609	112920	106175	82,56%	94,03%	-5991	811

In those electoral precincts of corresponding residences where have been recorded too much high percentages of participation, can give rise to doubt. With participation up to 70% with the results of the voting in 1391 electoral precincts no one of the candidates haven't got votes with the absolute majority. More than 70% participation in 597 electoral precincts, in which the general quantity of voters are equal 510550, the general quantity of participants are equal 397081, average 77.78% of participation is less probable, as it will outnumber the quantity of current voters in the corresponding electoral precincts. And in some precincts it outnumbers even the quantity of current population.




If we take account, that in Yerevan the quantity of voters are about 32.7% of the quantity of voters in the republic, where the average of participation is 54% (despite the high percent's of participation in some precincts of Yerevan), then in some regions, as for example in Ararat, Gegharkunik, Syunik and consequently too high percent's of participation in those numerous precincts

shows that voting results in those electoral precincts are not authentic.

In those precincts where the percentages of the quantity of voters who have participated in elections are high, the percentages of votes for current president-candidate of the republic are high too. When the percentages of participation in the precincts increase, the percentages of other candidates' votes decrease.

Below you can see the graphical charts, which are formed and calculated based on the voting results of corresponding precincts:




1-Hrant Bagratyan 2-Paruyr Hayrikyan 3-Raffi K. Hovannisyan

4-Andrias Ghukasyan 5-Arman Melikyan 6-Serzh Sargsyan 7-Vardan Sedrakyan


Calculated the percentages of the general votes from participation

1 - Hrant Bagratyan, 2- Paruyr Hayrikyan, 3-Rafi K. Hovannisyan, 4-Andrias Ghukasyan, 5-Arman Melikyan, 6-Serzh Sargsyan, 7-Vardan Sedrakyan

According to less participation from the indicated percentage in the selected precinct




According to more participation from the indicated percentage in the selected precinct



Here are represented the attendant increase of percentages of participation according to the accounted residences, graphical charts of dynamic percentage of votes of current president Serzh Sargsyan (1-st place) and Raffi K. Hovannisyan (2-nd place)



**III** Especially in those electoral precincts where have been decent public control by the civil organizations, have been recorded low percentages of participation and distributions of the other percentages of votes, than in those precincts in which haven't been realized decent public control.



Therefore, it isn't excluded the possibility of calculating votes of one candidate in favor of another one, by the way there are also published announcement about similar events in media.

**IV.** If there haven't been any functions not corresponding to the claims of the electoral legislation in electoral precincts before voting, during voting and calculating votes, then with the comparison of electoral numbers and its sums must be correspondence between them. And if in polling station before voting, during voting and calculating the votes there have been some process not corresponding to the claims of electoral legislation, so the electoral commission might report about it, which would explain the reason of discrepancy of electoral votes.

For example: If the voter has signed in signing list, but hasn't thrown the voting envelope into ballot-box, the commission would notice. So the fact, which the numbers of signatures are more than one from the numbers of the current envelopes in the ballot-box, would be based by the statement of commission in the electoral precincts. And the commission would do his job properly. Otherwise it means that the commission has broken the claim of legislation or worse, has falsified the signature. If there are more ballot-papers and envelopes in the ballot-box than the number of signatures in the electoral list, it means additional filling in ballot box, which should be noticed by commission.

And if in the ballot-box there are more envelopes than ballot-papers, so it means that some voters have taken out the ballot-papers from the electoral precincts. In this case we can suppose that there are circulation of ballot-papers in outside. So somebody obliges or bribes some group of voters and can give filled ballot-papers and require from voters to take out their empty ballot-papers from the polling station. In this case the media and police can clear up the situation. There are discrepancy of electoral votes in 638 electoral districts, where the general quantity of voters are 957393, the quantity of participants are 562357 (about 59% of general quantity of voters in that electoral precincts, in one part of those electoral precincts participation was more than 70%).

And if in the ballot-box there are more envelopes than ballot-papers, so it means that some voters have taken out the ballot-papers from the electoral precincts. In this case we can suppose that there are circulation of ballot-papers in outside. So somebody obliges or bribes to some group of voters and can give filled ballot-papers to require from voters to take out their empty ballot-papers


from the electoral precincts. In this case the media and law enforcement organizations can clear up the situation. There are discrepancy of electoral votes in 638 electoral districts, where the general quantity of voters are 957393, the quantity of participants are 562357 (about 59% of general quantity of voters in that electoral precincts, in one part of those electoral precincts participation was more than 70%).

So, any discrepancy of electoral numbers means that has been violation of voting orderliness defined by the legislation in the electoral precincts. And if higher commission hasn't taken steps to reveal the reasons why there are discrepancy of electoral numbers, so they haven't realized their responsibilities properly too.

Summarize these analyses, we can suppose, that results of voting weren't trustworthy in 1/3 of precincts and it could be appealed.

If the higher electoral commission acted properly, checked the results of voting and the signing lists of voters who participated in election, they could find out the factual sizes of electoral falsification and the real results of election. Public control had been absent in 2/3 of precincts too and it's possible, that votes hadn't been accounted right. In spite of it if we take account the voting results in the 2/3 of precincts weren't given doubt, so based on the voting results no one of the candidates have enough votes to be elected. And more than in 600 precincts, which have more than 77% suspicious participation, have been reported more than 80% votes in favor of Serzh Sargsyan. May be it's possible this kind of distribution of votes that the 100% of voters gives their votes for one candidate, but it's suspicious for 77% and more participation, when permanent and current quantity of population in the preliminary results of 2011 national census comparing to

2001 national census results are decreased (3213011-3018854) about 194157 (6.04%), and current quantity of population is decreased about 11% comparing to permanent population in 2001. It's interesting, that during the same years the quantity of voters has increased up to 9%. The quantity of voters in 2001 was 72, 29% of quantity of population, and in 2013 it was 83.64% of current population. In all cases, it's impossible to be more voters than 77% in more than 600 precincts, where the general quantity of voters is about 22% of the general quantity of voters in the republic.



The percentages of votes are calculated in correspondence precincts from the votes which are valid

The percentages of the valid votes and incorrectness are calculated from the quantity of participants in the corresponding precincts.

Besides that in all electoral precincts the number of invalid voting-papers, including in the electoral precincts, which aren't under suspicion, has formed 3, 35% of the number of participated voters in the election. Total number of voters is 88 % of quantity of current population.



Based on the applications of 2 candidates of President of the RA, in the decision (DCC - 1077), which has been passed by the Constitutional Court on 14 March, 2013, is pointed out:

“During the instant case trial, inquires of the Applicants mainly concerned to the declaration of the results of elections as invalid, in the framework of the materials attached to the applications. Regarding these materials, the parties were able to express the precise position at the Constitutional Court. Resulted from their combined assessment, the Constitutional Court stated that they could have been served as grounds or cause for appealing the results of voting in the electoral precincts in accordance with the procedure and time limit prescribed by law, which was not done. Exception is the arguments concerning the results of the voting in PEC 17/5, based on the examination of which, the RA Constitutional Court finds that those results could not be considered as trustworthy. Thus, based on Article 46, Part 10 of the RA Electoral Code the results of the voting in this precinct shall be considered as invalid, based on Article 72, Part 3 of the RA Electoral Code the number of the voters shall be stated as a sum of inaccuracies in the precinct. In accordance with Article 46, Part 10 of the RA Electoral Code, the Territorial Electoral Commission shall send all materials concerning this precinct to the RA Prosecutor’s Office”.

Let’s indicate that the general quantity of participants in 17/5 electoral precinct is 1328 (65.9%). The average minimum time of voting, from 17.00 o’clock to 20.00, for one table of registration a list is 36 seconds. It means that in the case of 2 tables, during 3 hours the quantity of participants is 606. With the final results of voting the number of signatures is more than 7, than the number of the envelopes in the ballot-box. And in a lot of precincts, which are without attention, there are participations with higher percentages and outnumbering the permissibility of the

corresponding precincts, discrepancies of the electoral numbers and other violations.

We can come to the following conclusion that the polls have passed with

- violations of claims of electoral legislation in a lot of electoral precincts,
- moreover electoral falsifications have system character.

By legislation there aren't sufficient conditions to find out the real results of voting in the doubtful electoral precincts, to invalidate elections in separate electoral precincts completely. The decisions about such matters are left for the subjective attitudes. About it speaks the decision of the Constitutional Court of RA too. And what refers to the commissions, proxies and bodies which make decisions, afterwards it is ridiculous when in a lot of electoral precincts with full of deviations, any kind of fact weren't recorded by the commissions or they didn't pay attention. 17/5 election district was exception, which was paid attention only in the Constitutional Court. About it was pointed out in the decision of the Constitutional Court. And that as a result of the 21-year-old American Armenian observer Which refused submission to the attempts to the pressure of law enforcement organizations and violence, and the announcements in the media of observers especially USA ambassador's announcement for her support.

The results of the voting, which are published officially, aren't authentic. The results of the election would be other in the case of:

- finding out the real results of voting
  - invalidating the results of the voting in the electoral precincts, where are full of deviations from the claims of electoral legislation
  - organizing re-voting to find out the real votes of voters.
- And how results would be, it would depend on the voters.

# THE ELECTIONS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF YEREVAN (2013)


## The quantity of population and voters in Yerevan



In the columns the percentages of voters are indicated with **black** color, the permanent population from numbers of the current population with **red** color. The numbers of current and permanent population of Yerevan are taken from the initial results of mandates (2011) published in web site armstat.am (2012). The numbers of voters have been calculated according to the data of voters' lists, inserted in corresponding times in web site passportvisa.am.

Permanent resident	1060138
Current resident	1054698
Voter 02/2013	810922
Voter 04/2013	817874
Voter 05/2013	816478

### The quantity of population and voters according to the regional administrations



. In above columns are indicated the percentages of voters from the numbers of permanent population with the published data for the elections of the city council of Yerevan 05/05/2013.

. In below columns are indicated the percentages of voters from the numbers of permanent population with the published data for the elections of the President of RA 18/02/2013.


. The quantity of permanent population of Yerevan is less than 58162 (1118300 - 1060138) according to the data of the initial results for census of the year 2011 published 2012 and calculated the population of the year 2011 in the web site "armstat.am".

According to published lists in February 2013 and in May 2013 in the web site "passportvisa.am" (2012), more than 1000 voters, who had registration in other residences up to 2013, in the elections of the city council of Yerevan have registration in Yerevan.


Let's notice that there isn't any kind of violation, but it is a chance to exaggerate the electoral lists. For example in 5252 addresses of Yerevan have registration in one address more than 10 voters, with total number 81959 voters.

Here are absent the dates of birth of 49103 voters.

To get mandates from the voted 7 political organizations, votes with necessary quantity have been calculated for 3 organizations.




Here are represented the graphics of the distribution of votes according to the percentages of participation, parties, which have got mandates.




According to the official published electoral numbers in 71 electoral precincts from 464 has been noted incorrectness. And there are discrepancies of electoral numbers in 259 electoral precincts.

Here are represented the general image with the final data of all 464 elections districts of Yerevan. According to the electoral numbers without distributing the votes




According to the final results of the poll in 259 electoral precincts there are discrepancies of electoral numbers. The general number of voters of those electoral precincts is 459598; the number of participants is 248350. If we take the great number of one discrepancies of every electoral precincts, the general average sum of discrepancies of those electoral precincts will be 1408, which will form 0.32% of 437079 participants in all elections districts of Yerevan (0.17% of the general number of voters). The number of discrepancies forms recorded discrepancy of the electoral numbers, 0.57% of the general number of participants in the electoral precincts.




## The calculated votes for parties according to less and more from 53% participations of the electoral precincts

According to **less** participation from the indicated percentage in the selected electoral precincts



According to **more** participation from the indicated percentage in the selected electoral precincts



**1-Arakilutyun**  
Arakilutyun Party

**2-PA**  
Prosperous Armenia Party

**3-Barev Yerevan**  
Barev Yerevan Alliance

**4-ANC**  
Armenian National Congress

**5-ARFD**  
Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnakutyun

**6-RPA**  
Republican Party of Armenia

**7-PCL**  
Party Country of Legality

## CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

For the reason of doubtful and full of electoral infringements in the electoral precincts it is difficult to estimate the real results of the poll. It is also senseless to come to a conclusion what result would be if in those electoral precincts were carried re-vote or new elections.

With the consequence of elections with electoral fakes, the great part of society doesn't trust to the official results of elections, which causes intolerant atmosphere after elections.

To increase the public confidence to the electoral system, to exclude electoral falsifications or in the presence of them for proper legal estimation it is very important to take account the following circumstances:

1. To pay attention on the impossible speeds of the poll
2. To accurate the lists of voters, taking account of the factual quantity of present voters in the republic
3. To exclude the possibility of calculating the votes in favor of another candidate
4. To record in time any kind of events, which cause discrepancy of electoral numbers or to recount the results of the poll in the election district, or to solve objectively the problem of invalidating the results of the poll in the electoral precincts.

In order every citizen trusted to the electoral institute, it is desirable that appropriate norms will be defined and will be organized measures by legislation. Among them:

- First of all addressing and numbering correctly of habitats, apartments and domiciles. All citizens' registration to make in the accurate addresses, but not in any streets, near street



in a yard or in the garden or building plot. And numerous voters to not let be taken account in incorrect address. Is it normal that the whole habitat or district with its different buildings, apartments and domiciles has only one address or hundred voters are taken account in the address of one apartment or domicile?

- Filling up the missing date of birth in the passport of about 70000 voters in the Republic.
- Publishing the data of voters who are absent from the republic and defining such norms of calculating the voters, which will limit the possibility of purposeful exaggeration of electoral lists and the possibility of voting instead of another person, for example the registration with finger-print or usage of automat system of voter identity.
- Forming the corresponding records during the poll, this will explain the cause of any kind of incorrectness of electoral numbers.
- Finding out the suspicious, the bases and the real results of the poll in the electoral precincts where the results will be doubtful objectively.
- Introduction and usage of such judicial norms, which will secure the electoral justice. Considering no valid according to the law the objectively doubtful and real results, undiscovered voting results of electoral precincts. To exclude possibilities the subjective approach. According to the law to do re-vote in the invalidated electoral precincts if the local quantity of all voters in the electoral precincts or the participated voters in the election will influence on the distributing correlation of mandates, even in the case of possibility of passing a mandate to another candidate.

- Securing social serious control, especially creating the possibilities to follow online the process of voting and the functions of calculating votes with the help of video cameras in the electoral precincts.

From the necessity of

- **Constitutional and Law Reform**
- **Making better the electoral legislation**
- **Making reliable the system of elections for all social classes**
- **Reducing the possibilities of electoral falsifications**
- **Increasing the confidence for the electoral system**

Here are some considerations about electoral systems.

In civilized, free and fair elections is also important that the rules of the election not to adapt to a parliamentary majority, to the leaders of some groups of people before the election, which occur constantly as experience shows.

According to the proportional electoral lists, when voters had voted for the list and mandates had been distributed between the first candidates of the lists, the experiments showed that the first candidates of party lists refused from the mandate, which could hardly be considered a proper attitude to the voters.

From the point of view of justice the president registration as a first candidate in party list can hardly be considered normal, who of course, will not leave the president post and will become a deputy.

Election-winning candidates are always supporters of presidential political party or become supporter of president with **Relative majority electoral system** when the candidate, who receives the relative majority of votes, can be elected.

If president changes, the majority of members of the National Assembly becomes supporter of new president as past experience shows it can take place without the intervention of voters, which does not fit the requirements of democracy, for this kind of situations it is better to hold new elections according to the law.

Up to now the elections in Armenia prove that it is hardly possible to expect holding of fair elections with relative majority or proportional linked lists of electoral systems or regulation of parliament according to real wishes of the overwhelming majority of voters.

Let's think about the best election systems for voters to exercise their full voting right, based on the needs of Constitutional reform, electoral legislation and to make credible electoral outcomes for all members of society, to reduce fraud and to increase the confidence for electoral system.

In our opinion, the issue of electoral system can be discussed in one constituency or regional constituencies, multi-mandate, by the principle of the right of the voter for more than one voice and with a transitive vote for the candidates and party lists of candidates in preference principle.

Electoral system, which retains for voters both the direct election of deputies from party's list or political party and decision for the rating of political party, political leaders. This will become the referendum for the electoral system and simultaneous elections of the National Assembly.

Multi-mandate, majority electoral system will provide adequate election and formation of the National Assembly in conformity with the opinion of overwhelming majority voters. Doing this the problem of the electoral system will also be solved by means of voters, regardless of the party leaders desires and the resulting amendments of electoral code or constitution.

Multi-mandate constituency or constituencies in the province, with the more votes for one voter, has more privileges comparatively to the other electoral systems, it ensures the Deputies greater independence from the executive power, as well as greater dependence on voters. It would also reduce the opportunities in bribes and coercion voting, as it would give all the candidates a rivalry between each other in the whole province or territory. The voter's right to vote for more than one candidate, who will be elected, will increase the number of votes for being elected and will detect overwhelming majority opinion for each candidate.

And in the case of maintaining the current system, at least the principle of the preferential proportional election system of voter's right to vote for candidate in list should be used, and mandates should be allocated by preferential majority system for list. For the majority electoral system as an alternative can be used two-phase or three-phase absolute majority electoral system.

It is worth thinking about the mechanisms, which will reduce the possibilities of polls bribe and corruption.

It will be correct if coming state elections are organized with the electronic voting of electronic documents or the participation of voters and the calculation of voting-papers are realized with the automatic system.

If the votes are held with the help of the voting machines, which will exclude the possibilities of voting instead of others and changing the voting results, and system will be equipped with an independent technical ability to operate without external interference, in this case the possibilities for organizing improper election and falsifying election results will reduce dramatically.

It is most important to decrease the possibilities of electoral commission members to take part in falsification, as well as probability of confirming the results of fraud.

The high level of social cohesion will be supported, if the direct democracy is widely practiced, i.e., when the most important laws and decisions are adopted in a referendum. The modern technology gives an opportunity to organize polls and electronic voting in a quick and effective way without fraud.



